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Abstract
Background: Unofficial payments in health services around the world are widespread and as varied as the health
systems in which they occur. We reviewed the main lessons from social audits of petty corruption in health
services in South Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan), Africa (Uganda and South Africa) and Europe (Baltic States).
Methods: The social audits varied in purpose and scope. All covered representative sample communities and
involved household interviews, focus group discussions, institutional reviews of health facilities, interviews with
service providers and discussions with health authorities. Most audits questioned households about views on
health services, perceived corruption in the services, and use of government and other health services. Questions
to service users asked about making official and unofficial payments, amounts paid, service delivery indicators, and
satisfaction with the service.
Results: Contextual differences between the countries affected the forms of petty corruption and factors related to
it. Most households in all countries held negative views about government health services and many perceived
these services as corrupt. There was little evidence that better off service users were more likely to make an
unofficial payment, or that making such a payment was associated with better or quicker service; those who paid
unofficially to health care workers were not more satisfied with the service. In South Asia, where we conducted
repeated social audits, only a minority of households chose to use government health services and their use
declined over time in favour of other providers. Focus groups indicated that reasons for avoiding government
health services included the need to pay for supposedly free services and the non-availability of medicines in
facilities, often perceived as due to diversion of the supplied medicines.
Conclusions: Unofficial expenses for medical care represent a disproportionate cost for vulnerable families; the
very people who need to make use of supposedly free government services, and are a barrier to the use of these
services. Patient dissatisfaction due to petty corruption may contribute to abandonment of government health
services. The social audits informed plans for tackling corruption in health services.
Background
Unofficial payments are a recognised problem in govern-
ment health services, especially in developing countries
[1]. These payments in cash or kind to health workers or
to institutions cover items already covered by the health
system [2,3]. The corrupt individual is one who possesses
power, and uses that power for personal gain, financial or
otherwise [4]. Unofficial payments in health services may
be fostered by asymmetry of information between physi-
cians and patients [5], faulty implementation of health
care reforms [6], low pay of employees [7,8], high
demand for service [7], legal vacuums [6,9], lack of infor-
mation on services [10], and desire to please the doctor
[11]. Despite the relatively small sums of each transac-
tion, in total such petty corruption represents a large
financial burden and a serious challenge to provision of
services, especially to the poorest in the population [12].
While many studies have reported on how common
unofficial payments are or their significance [13,14],
there is little epidemiological analysis of the risk factors
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for such payments. It is difficult to study unofficial pay-
ments because by their nature they are “hidden” and in
many countries are actually illegal; neither party to the
transaction will admit to it [15-17]. Social audit methods
[18] help to study unofficial payments as seen by
intended service users, incorporating the perspective of
service providers, and providing pointers for context-spe-
cific actions to tackle the problem [19,20].
Drawing on the work reported in a doctoral thesis
[21], we describe the main lessons from social audits of
petty corruption in health services in South Asia (Ban-
gladesh, Pakistan), Africa (Uganda and South Africa)
and Europe (Baltic States).
Methods
In Uganda and the Baltic States the social audits focused
specifically on corruption in health and other services
[16,22], while those in South Africa, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan were studies of perceptions, use, and experience
of health and other public services which included ques-
tions about unofficial payments [19,23-25]. In Bangladesh
and Pakistan we undertook a series of surveys, allowing
measurement of changes over time. Detailed descriptions
of the sampling, data collection, and analysis are available
in the reports and publications from the social audits
[16,19,22-25].
Several features were common to all the social audits:
interviews with household respondents in a representa-
tive sample of communities to ask about their use and
experience of health services; focus groups with separate
male and female groups in the sample communities to
discuss key findings from the household interviews; insti-
tutional reviews to examine health facilities serving the
sample communities; interviews with service providers;
and discussions with service planners and policy makers.
Most of the social audits included questions to all house-
holds (whether or not they had used government health
services) about their views of health services, about per-
ceived corruption in the services, and about their use of
government and other health services. Questions specific
to each context categorised socio-economic status and
vulnerability of households. Additional questions to
recent users of services asked about their experience of
making payments, official and unofficial, the amounts of
the payments, service delivery indicators (such as waiting
time and availability of information from the services),
and their satisfaction with aspects of the service they
received. Table 1 gives information about the surveys and
their samples.
Data entry in the surveys relied on Epi Info [26] and
included double data entry with validation to minimise
keystroke errors. Analysis relied on Epi Info and CIET-
map open-source software [27,28]. We calculated
weighted frequencies of outcomes (such as making an
unofficial payment), and examined variables related to
key outcomes in univariate and multivariate analysis,
using the Mantel-Haenszel procedure [29]. We report
here associations as adjusted Odds Ratios (ORa) and 95%
confidence intervals (CI).
In each country we attempted to use the findings from
the social audits (including focus group discussions) to
inform improvement of services. In some countries, like
Uganda, the focus was specifically on corruption, while in
other countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, it was
overall service delivery. The form and extent of this fol-
low-up activity varied between countries; it is not covered
in this review but is described in the reports of the indivi-
dual social audits [16,19,22-25].
Results
Household views about health services
In the social audits in seven countries reviewed here, most
households held negative views about government health
services. In the Baltic States only a minority rated govern-
ment health services as good (19% in Latvia, 26% in
Lithuania, and 39% in Estonia), while in Gauteng province
in South Africa just 19% considered health as the best run
government department. In Bangladesh, fewer households
rated government health services as good in 2000 and
2003 than in 1999 (10% vs. 38%), despite a health services
reform programme. In Pakistan, only about a quarter of
households reported satisfaction with government health
services (23% in 2002 and 27% in 2004).
At the same time, many households perceived govern-
ment health services as corrupt. In the Baltic States,
around half the households rated corruption in govern-
ment health services as high (43% in Estonia, 45% in Lat-
via, and 64% in Lithuania). Some 19% of households in
Gauteng province, and 27% of households in Uganda
rated health as the most corrupt government service.
Focus groups clarified that corruption (having to pay for
supposedly free services) was a major reason for low rating
of government health services.
“People are charged Rs 200 as a fee in public hospitals.
How can a poor person be expected to come up with
such a lot of money?” Male focus group, Pakistan.
“Health workers ask for ‘chai’ [bribes]; if you don’t
give it, you are not treated.” Female focus group,
Uganda.
Household use of government health services
In South Asia, only a small fraction of households chose
to use government health services, in preference to ser-
vices from other providers. In Pakistan, 29% of house-
holds in 2002 and 24% in 2004 reported they usually
used a government health facility for medical attention,
while 45% used private qualified practitioners, and a
quarter used unqualified medical practitioners (24% in
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2002 and 29% in 2004). In Bangladesh, use of govern-
ment health services for treatment in the last month fell
from 13% of households in 1999 to 10% in 2003, while
the proportion using private or NGO services in the
same period rose from 30% to 49%. Focus groups gave
important reasons for avoiding government health ser-
vices: the need to pay for supposedly free services, non-
availability of medicines in facilities (usually perceived as
due to diversion of the supplied medicines), and bad
behaviour from health workers, especially towards poor
patients.
“I went to the hospital to get medicines for stomach
pain. They did not give me any medicines. They wanted
money from me but I did not have money, so they did
not give me medicine. If we have to buy medicines from
the hospital then it is better to go directly to the phar-
macy.” Female focus group, Bangladesh
“Why should we pay tax, VAT, and then “cost-shar-
ing” in [government] hospitals?” Male focus group,
Uganda
Unofficial payments in health services
Our surveys asked about unofficial payments in govern-
ment health services in slightly different ways. In Uganda
and Gauteng province, we asked service users in house-
holds if they had made direct payments to health work-
ers. In Uganda in 1998, 28% reported making such a
payment, while in Gauteng province in 2003 only 1%
reported this. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, we asked
about a range of official and unofficial payments in gov-
ernment health facilities. In Bangladesh, about one in five
government health service users made direct payments to
health workers (21% in 1999, 20% in 2000, 18% in 2003).
In Pakistan in 2004, only 5% of users of government
health services reported paying directly to a service
worker; however, nearly all paid something for the visit,
including 65% who paid for medicines outside the facility
and 5% who paid for medicines inside the facility. Three
quarters paid for a registration ticket, and one half paid
more than the official rate for this ticket. In the Baltic
States, a small proportion of government health service
users reported they made an unofficial payment, usually
to the doctor (1% in Estonia, 3% in Latvia, 8% in
Lithuania).
There were differences between countries. In the Baltic
States, more service users reported giving a “gift” to a
health worker than making an unofficial payment: about
14% in all three countries reported giving a gift. In the Bal-
tic States, service users initiated most (around 80%) of the
reported unofficial payments; this contrasts with Uganda,
where health workers requested or demanded 90% of the
unofficial payments. In South Asia and Africa, focus group
participants expressed anger about being forced to make
unofficial payments. In the Baltic States, however, only
one half of households considered unofficial payments to
health workers as a form of corruption, and focus groups
suggested factors such as timing, amount, intention, and
who initiated the payment determined whether it should
be considered corruption.
Factors related to making unofficial payments
Separate multivariate analyses for each country examined
variables potentially associated with making unofficial
payments. Only one of our social audits produced any
evidence linking household economic status (assessed
according to the context of each country) with making
an unofficial payment. In Lithuania, households reporting
an income sufficient for their needs were more likely to
have made an unofficial payment (ORa 1.53, 95% CI 1.04
– 2.14). However, in Latvia (ORa 2.53, 95% CI 1.69 –
3.80) and Lithuania (ORa 2.10, 95% CI 1.55 – 2.86)
respondents with more education, and in Bangladesh
people from households with a literate head (ORa 1.48,
95% CI 1.18 – 1.85), were more likely to report making
an unofficial payment. In Uganda, people from house-
holds with a male head (likely to be less vulnerable than
Table 1 The social audits reviewed
Country Survey(s) Sample
Uganda National integrity survey 1998 18,412 households in all 45 districts
1,595 public service workers
348 male and female focus groups
South Africa
Gauteng province
Survey of health services
performance 2003
5,490 households
120 focus group discussions
Reviews of health facilities and interviews with health workers
Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania)
Survey of corruption in health and
licensing services 2002
Total 10,320 households in the three countries
90 focus group discussions
Reviews of 104 health facilities
Bangladesh Three surveys: 1999, 2000, 2003 In each survey, some 25,000 households, 200 health facilities, 200 key informants and
500 focus groups. In 2000 and 2003, 2,000 health workers
Pakistan Two surveys: 2002 and 2004 Households: 57,321 in 2002, 53,960 in 2004
In each survey 800 focus groups
In 2004, 1,000 local government key informants
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households with a female head) were more likely to
report an unofficial payment (ORa 1.24, 95% CI 1.10 –
1.40). In the Baltic States, gift giving was strongly asso-
ciated with making unofficial payments. There was little
evidence that making an unofficial payment was asso-
ciated with getting a better or quicker service. Indeed, in
Gauteng, South Africa, those people who waited less than
30 minutes for medical attention were less likely to report
making an unofficial payment (ORa 0.48, 95% CI 0.23 –
1.00). In Uganda, users of health services, as well as other
government services, who paid a bribe took longer to
complete their dealings with the service (ORa 2.04, 95%
CI 1.89-2.22), and saw more individual staff members.
Unofficial payments and satisfaction with service received
Those who paid unofficially to health care workers were
not more satisfied with the service. In general, there was
no association between making an unofficial payment
and reported satisfaction with the service received. In
Lithuania (ORa 0.49, 95% CI 0.33 – 0.73) and Uganda
(ORa 0.27, 95% CI 0.24 – 0.29), people who made an
unofficial payment were less likely to report satisfaction
with the service they received, taking other factors into
account.
Discussion
Several points in the health care process are vulnerable to
corruption, including the point of service delivery [30].
Measuring corruption at different levels of health care
requires different techniques. There are numerous oppor-
tunities for corrupt practices in hospital systems, including
bulk purchases of medicines and supplies, that do not
directly involve service users, that might be detected by
financial audits and stock-taking. Social audit is a powerful
tool for detecting and measuring corruption at the point
of service delivery. The approach can help to find factors
that increase the risk of corruption, as well as perceptions
of the public and service providers.
Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice and loyalty [31] has
sometimes been applied in health services research [32]
and, more pertinently, to health services delivery in
developing countries [33]. The theory suggests that giv-
ing users greater voice in the delivery of health services
should help to reduce desertion rates. Our series of social
audits in Bangladesh and Pakistan suggested that the
public were continuing to abandon government health
services to seek other health care options. Quantitative
and qualitative evidence from these social audits sug-
gested that the experience and perception of corruption
in the services was a factor driving people away. Other
authors have suggested that pressure by health employees
for payments may function as a barrier to using public
health services [34].
Unofficial payments have different forms and connota-
tions depending on the context. Giving gifts to health
workers seems normal and distinct from unofficial pay-
ments in the Baltic States, as in other countries in the
former Soviet Union [35]. There is no such tradition of
gift giving in Africa and South Asia. In the Baltic States,
service users initiated most of the payments. The trigger
for this might be desire for a better quality service [36],
or based on their own experience or that of their social
network [37]. Nevertheless, the intention to buy a better
service was apparently thwarted, since the service users
who made an unofficial payment were not more satisfied
with the service they received. In Uganda, almost all the
reported unofficial payments were in response to a
demand from the service provider, and those who paid
apparently experienced a slower service. This suggests
extortion by the more powerful service provider. Focus
group participants in Uganda, Pakistan and Bangladesh
said that people felt trapped, and forced into making
unofficial payments.
Lithuania excepted, the social audits presented here
did not find better-off users of government health ser-
vices were more likely to make unofficial payments. In
relation to their smaller overall incomes, unofficial
expenses for medical care represent a disproportionate
cost for vulnerable families, the very people who need to
use supposedly free government services, and thus are a
barrier to the use of these services.
Conclusions
Social audits allowed measurement of the frequency of
unofficial payments, the factors associated with them,
and what they meant to service users. The findings of
these social audits contributed to the understanding of
unofficial payments in government health services in the
countries concerned. Official bodies tasked with redu-
cing corruption took account of the findings when for-
mulating plans to tackle the problem of corruption in
these services.
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